Johnny Martinez v. Atty Gen VI by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-6-2013 
Johnny Martinez v. Atty Gen VI 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Johnny Martinez v. Atty Gen VI" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 258. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/258 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 










IVER STRIDIRON, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
PHILLIPS, IRA, WARDEN BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS 
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands: 
Appellate Division 
District Court No. 1-05-cv-00052 
District Judge: The Honorable Curtis V. Gomez 
District Judge: The Honorable Juan R. Sanchez  
Superior Court Judge: The Honorable Michael C. Dunston 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 3, 2012 
 
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 




_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Johnny Martinez was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 
2 
 
thirty-five years‘ imprisonment.  He subsequently filed a habeas petition under 
Virgin Islands law, which the Superior Court denied.  Martinez now appeals the 
denial of his habeas petition, contending that due process required his sentencing 
judge and habeas judge to recuse themselves and that the Virgin Islands sentencing 
provision for second-degree murder is unconstitutionally vague.  Because none of 
his arguments have merit, we will affirm the denial of his habeas petition. 
I. 
 In May 1997, Martinez shot and killed Ean Pemberton outside a Pueblo 
supermarket on St. Croix in the Virgin Islands.
1
  The Government of the Virgin 
Islands charged Martinez with first-degree murder in violation of 14 V.I. Code 
§ 922(a)(1) and unauthorized possession of a firearm during commission of a 
violent crime in violation of 14 V.I. Code § 2253(a).  The case was filed in the 
Superior Court of the Virgin Islands
2
 and assigned to Judge Edgar Ross, who 
subsequently recused himself.  As a result, then-Judge Maria M. Cabret (now a 
justice on the Virgin Islands Supreme Court) was reassigned to Martinez‘s case.  
Her courtroom bailiff, Iris Pemberton, was the victim‘s aunt.  
Several months later, Martinez entered into a plea agreement with the 
                                                 
1
 The parties have not provided any original documentation of the factual and 
procedural background, but these events do not appear to be in dispute. 
2
 At the time, the Superior Court was known as the Territorial Court of the Virgin 
Islands.  As of January 1, 2005, the name of the Territorial Court changed to the 
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Government and entered an Alford plea
3
 to second-degree murder in violation of 
14 V.I. Code § 923(b) and unauthorized possession of a firearm.  In exchange, the 
Government recommended consecutive sentences of thirty-five years for second-
degree murder and ten years for unauthorized possession of a firearm.  
Judge Cabret eventually adopted both of these recommendations, though the 
thirty-five-year recommendation for second-degree murder took a more circuitous 
path.  On that count, Judge Cabret initially sentenced Martinez to life 
imprisonment—a sentence that the law did not authorize.  See Ruiz v. United 
States, 365 F.2d 500, 501 (3d Cir. 1966) (holding that the Virgin Islands 
sentencing statute for second-degree murder, by setting a minimum sentence 
without a maximum sentence, authorizes any sentence for a term of years above 
the minimum but does not authorize life imprisonment).  The Government alerted 
Judge Cabret to this error, which she fixed by amending Martinez‘s life sentence to 
seventy-five years‘ imprisonment.  Martinez appealed to the Appellate Division of 
the United States District Court for the Virgin Islands,
4
 claiming that his seventy-
                                                                                                                                                             
Superior Court.  See Act of Oct. 29, 2004, No. 6687, § 1 (2004).  For consistency, 
we refer to this court as the Superior Court throughout this opinion. 
3
 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970) (holding that, when facing 
strong evidence of guilt, a defendant may plead guilty while protesting innocence 
to avoid going to trial). 
4
 At the time, the Virgin Islands had not yet established a local appellate tribunal, 
and appeals from the Superior Court went to a three-judge panel known as the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands, Appellate Division.  See Gov’t of the Virgin 
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five-year sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate to his crime.  The 
Appellate Division affirmed his sentence on November 23, 1999.  Back before 
Judge Cabret in Superior Court, Martinez moved for a reduction of his sentence.  
In February 2000, Judge Cabret granted that motion, reducing his seventy-five-
year sentence to thirty-five years—the Government‘s original recommendation. 
Martinez was still dissatisfied with his sentence.  In January 2003, he 
petitioned the Superior Court for a writ of habeas corpus under 5 V.I. Code § 1303, 
and the case was assigned to Judge Cabret, his sentencing judge.  Martinez argued 
that Judge Cabret should have recused herself from presiding over his criminal 
case, that the Virgin Islands sentencing provision for second-degree murder was 
unconstitutionally vague because it did not set a maximum penalty, and that his 
sentence violated his right to equal protection because it was harsher than other 
similarly situated defendants.  Later that year, Judge Cabret recused herself from 
Martinez‘s habeas case without explanation, citing 4 V.I. Code §§ 284(4) and 285, 
which require recusal if there is the appearance of bias.  Martinez‘s habeas petition 
was reassigned to Judge Ross—the same judge who had recused himself from 
Martinez‘s criminal case.  Judge Ross denied Martinez‘s habeas petition in 
October 2004 and subsequently denied Martinez‘s motion for reconsideration. 
Martinez appealed the denial of his habeas petition to the Appellate Division 
                                                                                                                                                             
Islands v. Hodge, 359 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2004) (describing the Virgin Islands 
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under 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a), beginning a protracted journey up and down the 
appellate ladder on various procedural issues.  On April 26, 2005, the Appellate 
Division remanded the case to the Superior Court to determine whether a 
certificate of probable cause should be issued under Virgin Islands Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 14(b), which requires such a certificate before a habeas 
petitioner may appeal the denial of his petition.  See Mem. Op., Docket Entry 
(―D.E.‖) 39 at 2.  But in December 2005, Judge Ross refused to follow Rule 14 on 
remand (either by granting a certificate of probable cause or explaining why he 
was denying it).  Id. at 3.  Judge Ross believed that Rule 14‘s certificate 
requirement was a substantive rule of law that exceeded the Appellate Division‘s 
procedural rulemaking authority.  Id.   
On January 5, 2007, before the Appellate Division, the Government moved 
to dismiss Martinez‘s appeal before the Appellate Division for lack of jurisdiction 
because no certificate of probable cause had been issued.  Martinez subsequently 
filed the opening brief in his appeal of the denial of his habeas petition.  But in 
April, Martinez moved to amend his opening brief to add a new argument—that 
due process required Judge Ross to recuse himself from ruling on Martinez‘s 
habeas petition—and Martinez also filed his opposition to the Government‘s 
motion to dismiss his appeal.   
                                                                                                                                                             
court system in existence at the time). 
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In February 2008, the Appellate Division remanded the case again to the 
Superior Court to consider whether to issue a certificate of probable cause.  See 
Mem. Op., D.E. 39 at 5.  The Appellate Division apparently never ruled on 
Martinez‘s motion to amend his opening brief.  While the case was pending before 
the Superior Court for a certificate of probable cause, Martinez asked the Appellate 
Division to suspend the probable-cause requirement of Rule 14 because he 
believed it was unconstitutional for violating the principle of separation of powers.  
In November 2010, the Appellate Division held that it could retain post-remand 
jurisdiction over Martinez‘s motion and took his motion under advisement. 
By January 2011, the Superior Court had still not ruled on whether to grant 
Martinez a certificate of probable cause so that he could appeal the denial of his 
habeas petition.  So Martinez appealed the dismissal of his case to this Court and 
also petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Appellate Division 
to exercise post-remand jurisdiction over the denial of his habeas petition.  See In 
re Martinez, 422 F. App‘x 92, 93 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  After filing his 
appeal and petition in this Court, the Superior Court finally issued a certificate of 
probable cause.  Id. at 94.  Consequently, this Court dismissed Martinez‘s appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction and denied his petition for a writ of mandamus.  Id. at 94–
95. 
With a certificate of probable cause in hand, the Appellate Division 
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proceeded to consider Martinez‘s appeal of his habeas petition on May 13, 2011.  
Martinez had already filed his opening brief in January 2007, so the Appellate 
Division set a briefing schedule for the Government‘s response brief and 
Martinez‘s reply brief.  The Government, however, never filed its response brief.  
See Mem. Op., D.E. 104 at 23 n.26.  On July 7, 2011, the Appellate Division 
affirmed the Superior Court‘s denial of Martinez‘s habeas petition, more than six 
years after Martinez had first filed his appeal.  See id. 




 Martinez says that due process required his sentencing judge, Judge Cabret, 
to recuse herself from presiding over his criminal case.
6
  Appellant‘s Br. at 28.  
                                                 
5
 The Appellate Division had jurisdiction over Martinez‘s appeal for the same 
reasons we recently explained in Hughley v. Government of the Virgin Islands, No. 
11-3845, slip op. at 4–6 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 2013).  We have jurisdiction under 48 
U.S.C. § 1613a(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Furthermore, Martinez‘s appeal to this 
Court may proceed despite the lack of a certificate of appealability. Under 28 
U.S.C. § 2253(c), a defendant in custody pursuant to a sentence of the Superior 
Court must obtain a certificate of appealability before he can appeal the denial of 
his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  See Walker v. Gov’t of the Virgin 
Islands, 230 F.3d 82, 89 (3d Cir. 2000).  Like habeas petitions under state law, 
however, the requirements in § 2253 for habeas petitions filed under § 2254 
(including the requirement of a certificate of appealability) do not apply to a 
habeas petition filed under Virgin Islands local law.  Martinez‘s petition was filed 
under 5 V.I. Code § 1303 and therefore § 2253‘s certificate-of-appealability 
requirement does not apply. 
6
 Before the Appellate Division, Martinez also argued that the Virgin Islands 
recusal statutes required Judge Cabret‘s recusal—an argument that the Appellate 
Division rejected on its merits.  We do not address this argument because 
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Although ―[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process,‖ In 
re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), ―most matters relating to judicial 
disqualification d[o] not rise to a constitutional level,‖ FTC v. Cement Institute, 
333 U.S. 683, 702 (1927).  Due process requires recusal only when a judge ―has a 
direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in a case‖ or when there are 
―circumstances in which experience teaches that the [objective] probability of 
actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be 
constitutionally tolerable.‖  Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876–
77 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  Martinez relies on both 
grounds: (1) that Judge Cabret‘s ―harsh‖ and unauthorized initial sentence of life 
imprisonment shows that she was actually biased against him, and (2) that Judge 
Cabret‘s friendship and work relationship with her bailiff, the aunt of Martinez‘s 
victim, created a serious risk of actual bias requiring recusal.   
Neither argument passes muster.  ―[J]udicial rulings alone almost never 
constitute a valid basis‖ requiring recusal.  Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. 
Am. Bar Ass’n, 107 F.3d 1026,1043 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Liteky v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)).  If anything, the record in this case demonstrates 
that Judge Cabret acted impartially: Although she initially erred by imposing an 
                                                                                                                                                             
Martinez‘s briefs in this Court focus on whether due process mandated Judge 
Cabret‘s recusal.  In any event, we agree with the Appellate Division‘s conclusion 
that the Virgin Islands recusal statutes did not require Judge Cabret‘s recusal. 
9 
 
unauthorized life sentence for second-degree murder, she promptly corrected that 
error by changing Martinez‘s life sentence to a seventy-five year sentence.  And 
when Martinez subsequently asked her to reduce that seventy-five year sentence, 
she did so by cutting it nearly in half.  Such evenhanded treatment is hardly the 
mark of a biased judge. 
Nor does Judge Cabret‘s relationship with the victim‘s aunt present one of 
the ―extraordinary situation[s] where the Constitution requires recusal‖ because of 
the serious risk of actual bias.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 887.  Our sister courts of 
appeals have consistently refused to hold that due process mandates recusal based 
on nothing more than a judge‘s familial or official relationships to others in the 
courtroom.  See, e.g., Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 428 
F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2005) (―[M]andatory disqualification . . . is not 
warranted simply because of a professional relationship with a victim.‖); Fero v. 
Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1479 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that due process does not 
mandate recusal in a criminal case where the judge‘s son worked for the 
prosecution and the judge‘s brother-in-law was plaintiff‘s counsel in a wrongful 
death action arising out of the criminal case because these interests were ―too 
remote and insubstantial to create a presumption of bias‖); Dyas v. Lockhart, 705 
F.2d 993, 997 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that there was not an unconstitutionally 
high probability of actual bias where a defendant was convicted of felony-murder 
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before a judge whose nephew, brother, and son were prosecuting the case and his 
wife was the court reporter).  And as we have previously explained, the Supreme 
Court has never held ―that an appearance of bias on the part of a judge, without 
more, violated the Due Process Clause.‖  Johnson v. Carroll, 369 F.3d 253, 262 
(3d Cir. 2004).  To the contrary—the Constitution leaves regulation of such 
―matters of kinship‖ and ―remoteness of interest‖ to ―legislative discretion.‖  
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876 (quoting Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)).  
Consequently, due process did not require Judge Cabret to recuse herself.   
III. 
 Martinez similarly argues that due process required Judge Ross to recuse 
himself from ruling on Martinez‘s habeas petition because Judge Ross‘s ―brother is 
married to the victim‘s wife‘s aunt.‖  Appellant‘s Br. at 10.  As a threshold matter, 
Martinez has waived this argument.  He did not present this argument in his 
opening brief before the Appellate Division.  Although he later moved to amend 
his brief to include this argument and the Appellate Division did not explicitly rule 
on his motion to amend, the Appellate Division impliedly denied his motion by not 
addressing this argument in its opinion upholding the denial of his habeas petition.  
Moreover, Martinez did not mention this argument again to the Appellate Division 
during the more-than-four years that passed between his attempt to amend his brief 
and the Appellate Division‘s ruling, despite the case moving up and down the 
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appellate ladder multiple times during that period.  Martinez therefore did not 
―unequivocally‖ present this argument to the lower court ―in a manner that 
permit[ted] the court to consider its merits.‖  Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 
182 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 At all events, for the same reasons that Judge Cabret‘s working relationship 
and friendship with the victim‘s aunt did not require recusal, Judge Ross‘s remote 
familial relationship with Martinez‘s victim did not require him to recuse himself 
from ruling on Martinez‘s habeas petition.  See United States v. Mansoori, 304 
F.3d 635, 667 (7th Cir. 2002) (―Conflicts arising from the judge‘s familial 
relationships normally do not mandate recusal under the due process clause.‖ 
(citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986))).   
IV. 
Martinez argues that 14 V.I. Code § 923—the Virgin Islands sentencing 
provision for second-degree murder—is unconstitutionally vague because it sets a 
five-year minimum penalty without setting a maximum penalty.  Appellant‘s Br. 
at 14.  Under the Constitution‘s Due Process Clause, a sentencing provision is 
unconstitutionally vague if it fails to give notice that the punishment imposed is 
one of the possible penalties.  Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. D.W., 3 F.3d 697, 699 
(3d Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 121 (1979)).  We 
review the constitutionality of a federal statute de novo.  Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 
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239 F.3d 307, 311 (3d Cir. 2001).  ―Where, as here, a statute does not involve 
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, we examine whether it is vague as 
applied to the affected party.‖  United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 152 (3d Cir. 
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Martinez‘s void-for-vagueness argument fails.  Our sister courts of appeals 
have repeatedly and uniformly rejected the argument that a criminal statute is 
unconstitutionally void just because it does not establish a maximum penalty.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Davis, 801 F.2d 754, 756–57 (5th Cir. 1986) (―It is well 
established that sentencing statutes are not unconstitutionally vague for failure to 
fix a maximum sentence.‖), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924; United States 
v. Bridges, 760 F.2d 151, 154 (7th Cir. 1985) (rejecting the argument that 18 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) is unconstitutional because it failed to specify a maximum 
sentence); United States v. Sims, 529 F.2d 10, 12 (8th Cir. 1976) (―Due process is 
not violated by failure of a sentencing statute to specify the maximum sentence of 
imprisonment or parole.‖ (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Binkley 
v. Hunter, 170 F.2d 848, 849–50 (10th Cir. 1948) (―Under a statute such as this, 
fixing a minimum sentence and leaving the imposition of the maximum sentence to 
the court, and the only limitation upon the power of the court in imposing sentence 
would be that of the Eighth Amendment . . . .‖).  And Martinez does not cite any 
authority to the contrary.  Indeed, our prior decisions make clear that § 923 
13 
 
authorizes imprisonment for any ―fixed definite term of years‖ (that is, not life 
imprisonment), see Ruiz, 365 F.2d at 501, a range that squarely includes 
Martinez‘s thirty-five-year sentence.  See United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 
211 (3d Cir. 2012) (―In criminal cases, because vagueness attacks are based on 
lack of notice, they may be overcome in any specific case where reasonable 
persons would know their conduct puts [them] at risk of punishment under the 
statute.‖ (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 
Stripped of his void-for-vagueness challenge, Martinez‘s real complaint is 
that his thirty-five-year sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate to his 
crime.  See Appellant‘s Br. at 23 (―If the courts of the Virgin Islands are allowed to 
continue to arbitrarily and discriminately sentence criminal defendants to lengthy 
sentences on convictions of second degree murder under 14 V.I.C. § 923(b) 
without any legally fixed bounds . . . .‖); id. at 27 (stating that ―no one convicted 
for the same offense in [Martinez‘s] sentencing year‖ received as ―harsh‖ of a 
sentence as Martinez did).  Of course, the Eighth Amendment, ―which forbids 
cruel and unusual punishments,‖ does ―contain[] a narrow proportionality principle 
that applies to noncapital sentences.‖  United States v. Walker, 473 F.3d 71, 79 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (quoting Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003)).  And although 
this narrow proportionality principle ―applies to sentences for terms of years‖ (such 
as Martinez‘s sentence), ―only an extraordinary case will result in a constitutional 
14 
 
violation.‖  Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72, 77 (2003)); see also 
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (―Outside the context of capital 
punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences 
have been exceedingly rare.‖).   
This is not such an extraordinary case.  Martinez‘s sentence is within the 
limits set by the Virgin Islands legislature.  See United States v. Miknevich, 638 
F.3d 178, 186 (3d Cir. 2011) (―Generally, a sentence within the limits imposed by 
statute is neither excessive nor cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.  
This is so because we accord substantial deference to [the legislature], as it 
possesses broad authority to determine the types and limits of punishments for 
crimes.‖ (citations omitted)).  Martinez does not explain why, ―as is his burden,‖ 
his thirty-five-year sentence for second-degree murder is cruel and unusual.  Id.  
By contrast, the Appellate Division has already sufficiently explained why 
Martinez‘s interim sentence of seventy-five years was not grossly disproportionate 
to his crime: 
Martinez shot the victim from behind and seven more times after he 
was already down, three of which were to the back of the head.  
According to the witnesses, Martinez calmly walked around the fallen 
victim, methodically and repeatedly shooting him.  Additionally, the 
trial court noted the facts before it tending to show that this was a 
revengeful, purposeful killing. 
 
Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20045, at *10–11 (D.V.I. App. 
Div. 1999).  Given the circumstances of his crime and his thirty-five-year sentence, 
15 
 
this case does not remotely resemble any of the rare situations in which the 
difference between the crime and the sentence was unconstitutionally 
disproportionate.  Compare Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 281 (1983) (holding that 
the Eighth Amendment prohibited a life sentence without the possibility of parole 
for a recidivist offender convicted of ―uttering a ‗no account‘ check for $100‖), 
with Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961 (1991) (rejecting a proportionality 
challenge to a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole imposed 
on a first-time offender convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine), and 
Walker, 473 F.3d at 83 (concluding that a defendant‘s fifty-five-year sentence for 
armed robberies and drug-trafficking crimes was not unconstitutional).  
Consequently, we reject Martinez‘s proportionality challenge to his sentence. 
V. 
 Martinez also argues that the Virgin Islands Legislature has 
unconstitutionally delegated discretion to the Virgin Islands courts to impose any 
sentence for second-degree murder (above the mandatory minimum of five years).  
He also argues that this arrangement violates separation of powers.  He did not 
present these arguments in his habeas petition and did not raise these arguments 
before the District Court.  Consequently, these remaining arguments are waived, 
and we decline to consider them now.  Shell Petroleum, Inc., 182 F.3d at 219 
(noting ―the well-established rule that absent compelling circumstances an 
16 
 
appellate court will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal‖ 
(quoting Patterson v. Cuyler, 729 F.2d 925, 929 (3d Cir. 1984))). 
* * * * * 




Martinez v. Stridiron, No. 11-2938 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.  
As I explained in my dissent in Hughley v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 2013 
WL 4492709 *3 (3d Cir. Aug. 23, 2013), I believe that a certificate of appealability is 
required before a Virgin Islands prisoner may appeal an order of the District Court for the 
Virgin Islands denying his habeas petition to the Court of Appeals, regardless of whether 
his initial petition was filed pursuant to 5 V.I.C. § 1303 or 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  Because no 
certificate of appealability was obtained in this case, we lack jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2253.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
